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Marcel Duchamp, Art and the Ethical 
Signicance of a Renewed Relationship 
with the Object
In this paper I shall show that the artworks of Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968) harbour as yet unheeded ontological and ethical implications. I shall do 
this through an investigation of Duchamp’s readymades and his writings on 
“indierence,” as well as Duchamp’s most complex work, e Large Glass. I shall 
show that Duchamp’s works accomplish a recalibration of the work-spectator 
relationship through which modern art reclaims and proclaims the object’s 
inherent rights to self-manifestation and self-a%rmation. I conclude by showing 
that the challenge posed by Duchamp’s art does not pertain to art alone, but calls 
for a genuine renewal of our ethical relationship with the other generally. 
e Production of Readymades
“e Ready-mades are anonymous objects that the artist’s gratuitous gesture, 
the mere fact of choosing them, converts into works of art.”1
 * Manuel Vella Rago obtained his PhD in philosophy from the University of Malta in 
2014, with a thesis entitled “Sameness: Heidegger and Wittgenstein in a Post-Metaphysical 
Situatedness.” His research interests include metaphysics, post-metaphysics, contemporary 
continental philosophy including recent developments in Anglophone Continental Philosophy 
and contemporary aesthetics. Parts of this paper were the basis of a talk on Marcel Duchamp’s 
readymades which he gave at “Mediterranea 16,” an international multidisciplinary event held in 
Ancona, Italy on June 6-7, 2013, as listed in the event catalogue Mediterranea 16: Errors Allowed 
(Ancona: Quodlibet, 2013). 
 1 Octavio Paz, “e Castle of Purity,” in Octavio Paz, Rachel Phillips and Donald Gardner, 
Marcel Duchamp: Appearance Stripped Bare, trans. Donald Gardener (New York: Seaver Books, 
2011), 21.
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Marcel Duchamp’s theory of art seems, at face value, rather simple and 
bere! of the depth to which artists and art theorists, even contemporaneous 
with Duchamp himself, have accustomed us. He claims that everything is art 
if deemed and called so by an artist.2 “Art,” therefore, does not name a criterion 
of excellence; something does not have to reach a preset standard of quality to 
acquire the right to be called art. ere is art, Duchamp seems to imply; it is a 
fact. Art, however, occurs in a creative act which is never fully determined by the 
artist alone, but involves the spectator’s participation. In fact, Duchamp claims 
that,
all in all, the creative act is not performed by the artist alone, the spectator brings 
the work in contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting 
its inner qualications and thus adds his contribution to the creative act. is 
becomes ever more obvious when posterity gives its nal verdict and sometimes 
rehabilitates forgotten artists.3 It is the spectator who, through a kind of “inner 
osmosis,” deciphers and interprets the work’s inner qualications, relates them to 
the external world, and thus completes the creative cycle.4
e creative act intrinsically necessitates the work’s encounter with a public 
and must, therefore, be exhibited. Duchamp argues also that the intention of 
the artist, although not exhaustive, is important. It has a pivotal role in the event 
of the creative act and he allocates a very precise place to it in the evaluation 
of good, bad or indi$erent art.5 He does so by introducing what he calls the 
“personal art coe%cient”6 which measures the artist’s success, and lack of it, in 
imparting to the spectator his or her intention. For Duchamp, therefore, in the 
work-spectator encounter there is space for the artistic intention of the artist.
is is an extremely important point to bear in mind when evaluating the 
readymades artistically. ere is valuable evidence for Duchamp’s own relation 
to these everyday objects and to their “charm.” As is well known, Duchamp 
describes the objects which become the readymades as primarily objects of 
aesthetic indi!erence;7 objects, that is, that arouse in him no positive or negative 
 2 See Lucy R. Lippard, Dadas on Art: Tzara, Arp, Duchamp and Others (New York: Dover, 
2007), 139. e circularity of the argument here is evident. Whether this circularity is vicious or 
not would have to be ascertained on another occasion. Here, these claims will be accepted at face 
value because it is not within the scope of this paper to o$er an internal critique of Duchamp’s 
writings. 
 3 Marcel Duchamp, e Creative Act (Paris: L’Echoppe, 1987).
 4 Calvin Tomkins, e Bride and the Bachelors, expanded ed. (New York: Viking Press, 1965).
 5 Duchamp, e Creative Act.
 6 Ibid.
 7 I shall not be going into political interpretations of the meaning of “indi$erence” as one 
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aesthetic reaction. He calls this “a remarkable achievement.” is achievement 
is for Duchamp, in fact, their weird “attraction,” namely: their ability to put 
the spectator in a state of indierence. It seems to me therefore that with the 
readymades, Duchamp’s “artistic intention” is to let this indierence present 
itself to the spectator. e readymade artworks would not themselves be 
“indierent works of art” - as opposed to good and bad works of art - but, rather, 
good works of art which as such present to the spectator the everyday object’s 
aesthetic indierence. e readymade artwork’s aesthetic indierence would not 
simply amount to the everyday object’s inability to arouse immediate negative or 
positive reactions in the person encountering it, but, at the same time, it would 
also include the spectator’s positive reluctance to judge (positively or negatively) 
and situate the readymade artwork’s aesthetic signicance. us, in the case of 
the readymades, aesthetic indierence is necessarily the outcome of a complex 
artistic event involving the work, the spectator and the artist in a single creative 
act.8 
us, Duchamp’s readymades are artworks. Not only because we can now 
safely vouch for this since history and academia have equally accepted and 
lauded them as good art but also because by Duchamp’s own criteria, these objects 
become artworks simply in virtue of their being produced and exhibited by an 
artist. But, can one really say that the readymades were produced by Duchamp? 
Although most of these objects are usually crassly and commonly available for 
anyone to see and use, their exposition as artworks, thus their being produced 
and put forth as artworks, is the work of Duchamp. e powerful and insightful 
experience into the strange aesthetics of these vulgar objects urges Duchamp to 
turn towards them, as anonymous objects, artistically.9 But, do such common 
objects of everyday life lose their paleness simply by being produced, which here 
means put forward, as works of art by the artist Duchamp?
Duchamp’s primary accomplishment is that of having translated his openness 
to the peculiar, mute aesthetic of common everyday objects into a potentially 
nds, for instance, in Moira Roth’s !e Aesthetic of Indierence. Interesting and illuminating as 
Roth’s analyses are, I tend not to agree with the relation between the “political setting” she 
gives and the reaction to it of artists like Duchamp, Cage, Cunningham, etc. See Moira Roth, 
“e Aesthetic of Indierence,” in Moira Roth and Jonathan Katz, eds. Dierence/Indierence: 
Musings on Postmodernism, Marcel Duchamp and John Cage, (Singapore: GB Arts International, 
1998). 
 8 Duchamp, !e Creative Act.
 9 e reader is to note that this articulation of the readymades’ appearance as artworks revolves 
around Duchamp’s artistic world-view which, I believe, “accompanies the object… like a users’ 
manual.” See Alain Badiou, “Some Remarks Concerning Marcel Duchamp,” accessed January 24, 
2013, http://www.lacan.com/symptom9_articles/badiou29.html accessed 24/01/2013.
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communicating phenomenon, namely works of art. Duchamp somehow saw 
that, only by making of these objects “works of art,” thus only by producing them 
as artworks, do they and their very muteness become conspicuous. Only at that 
stage could their everyday mute presence demand a creative work-spectator 
relationship for itself. Yet, why should one bother putting forward this everyday-
muteness so as to show itself and to present itself to the public? Brie!y, the 
reason is: to counter the readymade-culture. I believe that Duchamp’s readymade 
artworks o"er a remedy to the culture of the readymades. 
#ere exist today, possibly more than ever before, not only common, blunt, 
pale and anonymous everyday objects, but also readymade presuppositions, 
readymade “saids” and “not-saids,” dos and don’ts, readymade opinions and 
expectations and world views. #ese are usually indicative of the one same thing, 
namely, a blind participation in the widespread understanding of things. 
#is is true also, and indeed especially true, in the case of art. Viewers, artists, 
art critics, art historians and art theorists, o$en feel diversely obliged to abide by 
a habitual behaviour characteristic of the artworld.10 #is behaviour can result 
in two basic stances towards the readymade, but equally also towards any other 
artwork. #e two stances appear to be opposites but, really, they speak the same 
language. On the one hand, the common and connoisseur exhibition-goer can 
dismiss the readymade as not worth the challenge, simply discrediting the work 
and judging it as non-art. According to this stance, art is way too lo$y an activity 
and a discipline to bother with such petty proposals. On the other hand, the 
spectator can step into the “interested/interesting” mode whereby he ventures, 
more or less boldly, to understand and to make sense out of what he sees. My 
emphasis on “make” here is important because, in such cases, the spectator really 
believes that the sense, if any, of the artwork, depends on him; literally, he is 
to make something out of it. #e art-connoisseur, more o$en than not, makes 
sure to publicly a%rm that he &nds such process of making-sense fascinating, 
stimulating, positive, interesting, fun and even healthy. He even makes sure to 
claim this publicly when, more o$en than not, with cool and nonchalance, he 
ultimately dismisses the whole enterprise as unimportant and even futile. 
Hence, the two apparently opposite reactions to the artwork are rooted in 
the same basic dismissal of the work itself. Confronted by such strong dismissive 
reactions, the very radical, yet fragile and delicate aesthetic importance of the 
readymades, is squashed and annihilated. 
 10 I borrow this term from Arthur C. Danto. See, for instance, his “#e Artworld,” !e Journal 
of Philosophy 61, no.19 (1964): 571-584.
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Most commonly, however, the viewer stands somewhere in between these 
two extreme positions and, dismissing (actively or passively, consciously or not) 
the work itself as mere provocation of no intrinsic value, turns to the immediate 
context in which the object is exhibited - the museum, art history and theory 
textbooks or reviews, exhibition hall or prestigious curatorship - as indicative 
of its worth and justication. He thinks of the dialectical tension between a 
valueless object and an extremely valuable space or attention as a “valuable” artistic 
provocation. is position usually leads to the claim that, with the readymades, 
it has become clearly evident that what turns an object, even a common one, into 
a “work of art” is simply its acceptance by, and inclusion into, an acknowledged 
and authoritative artworld context.11 
ere is in fact truth in this last, median, position. Duchamp’s readymades 
do provoke; indeed I shall be describing them as essentially “a challenge.” eir 
provocation is, however, not so much directed towards a rethinking of the art-
institution relationship but, rather, to our own ability to-be-spectators of a work 
of art - an exhibit in a museum, exhibition or any other artworld institution or 
context - in general. 
Before progressing, let us recall three main criteria which, reading Duchamp, 
seem to be necessary for the very emergence of works of art. ese include that:
a. the artist human being decides for their production as artworks; 
b. the creative act includes the encounter between the work and the 
spectator; 
c. the artist’s intention is important and should secure some role in the 
work-spectator encounter. 
is is, basically, the theoretical framework that enables the readymade 
objects to become good works of art. e result? Nothing. ey remain mute. 
ese objects still have no aesthetic quality. Why, one may rightly ask, should 
such things be put there, to stand stark naked at the centre of attention? What is 
expected of the spectator in front of these objects’ abject nakedness?12 
ese questions and comments are not accidental and person-specic; they 
are not even outdated. ey encapsulate, I believe, the most general and popular 
reactions that people still have when faced with any of the readymades. One 
 11 Exponents of versions of the conventional or institutional theory of art famously include 
Arthur C. Danto and George Dickie. See, for instance, Arthur C. Danto, “e Transguration 
of the Commonplace,” !e Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33, no.2 (1974): 139-148, and 
Goerge Dickie “What is Art? An Institutional Analysis,” in Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional 
Analysis (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974). 
 12 “e word ‘naked’ is found everywhere [in Duchamp’s works],” Badiou, “Some Remarks 
Concerning Marcel Duchamp.”
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needs just observe people surrounding the Fountain even today whenever and 
wherever it is exhibited to agree to this.13 !us, the main issue seems to be this: 
how can a spectator be-there, be a spectator of a readymade artwork, without 
succumbing to that strange embarrassment which emerges immediately and 
which urges him to hide or to look away? How to refrain from hurriedly making 
out of the stark nudity of a common object something other than what it is, 
either a “nothing” or “something else,” perhaps “more profound”? How to refrain 
from, driven maybe by the most positive intentions, dignifying the object in a 
direction which plainly takes one’s attention away from it? How to be-there as 
spectator without succumbing to readymade dicta, platitudes on its interesting 
claims on art? Or, how not to succumb to claiming to have ("nally!) realized 
that even the dull, commonly known façade of an everyday object does indeed 
hide shades of aesthetic beauty which, themselves as well ‒ why not? ‒ should be 
appreciated?
Because, and this is the basic conviction of this paper written by one, common 
spectator of the works of Duchamp, the very essence of Duchamp’s readymades 
challenges and urges the spectator to sustain and endure, rather than escape 
or su&ocate, such an experience of the object. Endurance is key to an original 
openness towards the object. I believe that, consistent with Duchamp’s writings 
on these works, one must say that the readymades invite the spectator into an 
artistic event whose ideal, yet natural, o&spring would be the experience of the 
radical aesthetic indi&erence of the object exhibited. Endured, such indi&erence 
would usher in and welcome the manifestation of the object in its crass and banal 
factuality. !e obscene artistic manifestation of the aesthetic indi&erence of an 
object of everyday consumption acts as prelude to the possibility of reckoning 
anew with the thing or the object itself.14 Duchamp’s readymade artwork invites 
the everyday object to manifest wholly and only itself and, in accordance with the 
creative act dynamic principle it, in turn, invites us - the spectators - to see it for 
what it is. 
As soon as in the creative act the aesthetic indi&erence of the object produced 
by the artist is not endured and corroborated by the spectator’s judgemental 
indi&erence, the spectator turns violent. Faced with such an obscene challenge, 
the spectator either *ees when faced with the object or challenges it to destruction. 
 13  To get a feel for what I mean here, the reader is invited to look for a short "lm directed by 
Mike Figgis for Tate Modern “3 Minute Wonder: Marcel Duchamp ‘Fountain’,” YouTube video, 
posted by Tate, March 4, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIApXD-TdDs. 
 14 Although this sounds Kantian, a Kantian interpretation of the readymades or of the object 
generally is not what is being pursued here. !e extent, if at all, to which my claims can be 
considered Kantian in nature cannot be assessed here. 
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Indeed, as a natural reaction, the spectator oen opts for a synthesis of these two 
reactions and, by interpreting the artwork in a habitual way that explains its very 
presence and existence away, annihilates its strange and unbearable uncannyness. 
“I [Duchamp] was aware at that time that for the spectator even more than for 
the artist, art is a habit-forming drug and I wanted to protect my ‘ready-mades’ 
against such contamination.”15
My claim is, therefore, that the widespread habit of immediately engaging in 
the activity of interpreting every object we come across, risks inducing us to lose 
sight of the fact that the originality of the readymades as an event in the history 
of western art is, primarily, to urge the spectator to re!ain !om either plainly 
dismissing or over-interpreting the artwork or indeed, I claim, any object. !e 
readymades seem to demand that, standing in front of them, the spectator lets a 
kind of equilibrium take place which, rather than "lling – further endowing him 
with ideas on art and with interesting, theoretical and aesthetic connections – 
is emptying. Duchamp’s readymades urge an artistic catharsis which, I believe, 
is the prelude for a renewed artistic expression and aesthetic experience of the 
artwork and, more generally, a prelude for a renewed, mindful relationship with 
the object. Because, in the readymade-culture, we do need to be made to see the 
urgency for a renewed awareness of the object itself: “It is, evidently, impossible 
to just look.”16 “[Dada] was a way to get out of a state of mind - to avoid being 
in#uenced by one’s immediate environment, or by the past: to get away from 
clichés ‒ to get free. !e “blank” force of Dada was very salutary.”17 
e Large Glass: A Complex Invitation to Attend to Simplicity
!e readymades shock the sensitive spectator by challenging him to attend to 
a vulgar object. Art urges the spectator to refrain from dismissing the object and, 
equally, from turning it into something else perhaps by make it “interesting.” I 
call this the “indi&erence-challenge.” In the following, I shall show that it ushers 
in the possibility of our abiding by what I call the “a-interesting attitude.”18
 15 Marcel Duchamp, “Apropos of ‘Readymades’,” in "e Writings of Marcel Duchamp, ed. 
Michel Sanouillet and Elmer Peterson (New York: Da Capo, 1973), 142.
 16 Arthur C. Danto, “Just Looking,” in "e Nation April 7, 2008, 41-44.
 17 Marcel Duchamp in “Interview with Marcel Duchamp,” by James Johnson Sweeney, in 
Lippard, Dadas on Art, 141.
 18 It is probably good to clarify that, notwithstanding similarities in my use of terms such as 
“a-interesting” with those found in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement, I shall be making 
no reference to Kant in this article. Kant’s use of the term “disinterest” is essentially bound to 
matters of taste and beauty whereas here I shall be using similar terms in relation to occasions 
characterised by the radical absence of beauty and ugliness. !us again, an evaluation of the 
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 e term “a-interesting” as used here is not synonymous with “indi"erence.” 
Indi"erence, as I see it, makes room for the emergence of the “a-interesting 
attitude” which, in the successful creative act, lets the object present itself. 
 us, the “a-interesting” falls nowhere in the spectrum delimited by the 
“interesting” and the “not-interesting.”  e “a-interesting attitude” is a 
formal space of content-ability; it does not urge a contentless, dull and 
vacuous passivity on the part of the spectator but, rather, the very opposite. 
It challenges the spectator’s attentive sensibility to notice the emergence of 
a very particular content, namely, the self-a#rmation and self-acclamation 
of the object. e “a-interesting attitude” unfolds precisely at that juncture 
when the spectator is (made) conscious of his activity and responsibility as 
a spectator. “A-interesting” names the outcome of a successful realization of 
a very particular work-spectator relationship through which the readymade 
object is set-free to positively produce and present itself as the everyday object 
which it is. 
 e readymades, therefore, enact a recalibration of artistic experience and 
evaluation. As an event in the history of western art, the readymades mark an 
absolute-zero point where proper appreciation of an object touches upon, but 
di"ers completely from, “interpretation” of the object. Because, without an 
active process of interpretation on the part of the spectator, the common object 
of everyday life does not implode into nothingness; it does not dissolve into an 
unidenti$ed thing. Without such interpretation, the object still is something; 
and, without interpretation at all, something is what it presents itself as. 
At this stage, it is important that my claims are not misinterpreted. I should 
note - especially because of the similarities in words and formulations - that I 
am adamantly unwilling to support the thesis put forward by Susan Sontag in 
an important essay entitled Against Interpretation.19 ere she says: 
In most modern instances, interpretation amounts to the philistine refusal to 
leave the work of art alone. Real art has the capacity to make us nervous. By 
reducing the work of art to its content and then interpreting that, one tames 
the work of art. Interpretation makes art manageable, comfortable.20 … Our 
task is not to find the maximum amount of content in a work of art, much 
less to squeeze more content out of the work than is already there. Our task is 
to cut back content so that we can see the thing at all.21 … The best criticism, 
extent to which my claims are congruent with or complementary to Kant’s aesthetic theories will 
have to be postponed to another context. 
 19 Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1966).
 20 Ibid., 8.
 21 Ibid., 14.
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and it is uncommon, is of this sort that dissolves considerations of content 
into those of form.22 
On the face of it, my thoughts seem rather congruent with those of Sontag. 
However, this is not the case. I believe that Sontag moves too easily, too quickly 
from dismissing the prevalent and dominant role of artworld interpretation in 
contemporary art-appreciation to the positing of, and arguing for, a sensuous 
characterization of the proper relation between work and spectator: “In place of 
a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art.”23
!is is a dangerous and illegitimate shortcut which, because I chose to tackle 
the art-problem from and through Duchamp, I have avoided making myself. 
Duchamp’s work is surely not sensuous - “olfactory” or “etinal” - and it does 
not urge a sensuous response from the spectator. In the readymades, the object 
is introduced - indeed produced - bringing-with(-it) simply what it is, and the 
spectator is urged to see, understand and take note of this. As a spectator, I 
believe that the challenge posed by Duchamp’s art is, therefore, to let the exhibit 
be what it is without dismissing it or interpreting it further, thus re aining  om 
playing the game of the “interesting prejudice” whereby the object is interpreted and 
transformed into something else in accordance with the immediate interest/s of the 
spectator. Hence, I claim, the need to dwell with the object in the “a-interesting 
conviction and attitude,” aware that “interesting” is not a proper response on our 
part to the manifest banality of the object produced. 
Against Sontag, therefore, it is to be noted that what the object is, is not 
necessarily determined sensuously.24 Rather, Duchamp’s readymades expose the 
ontological fact that an object is determined primarily by its being the very object 
which it is, for instance, in its everyday contribution to our lives. !roughout 
its life, the object instantiates, acquires or adopts a positive ontological identity. 
Intellectually boring (or indi&erent) as it may indeed be, this is what the 
readymade artwork reverts to, produces forth and demands that the spectator’s 
full and open attention attends to. 
!erefore, the leap is not simply from “traditional-interpretations” to 
“sensuous captivation” as Sontag seems to urge but, rather, from “interpretation” 
to “simple and common awareness” of the object. Such awareness does not 
need to be intellectually-vacuous or to be simply sensuous; on the contrary, the 
readymades have the potential to show that, bere# of any traditional (artworld) 
 22 Ibid., 12.
 23 Ibid., 14.
 24  !is is, arguably, itself a very interesting (over- or under-) interpretation of the object-hood 
of the object.
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interpretation, the object does not dissolve into a sensuous itch but rather retains a 
de!nite and complex ontological identity of its own. 
"e fact that a readymade object is the thing which it is, namely the common 
thing which everyone immediately “knows as” this or that thing, is not the 
result of an active interpretative work of some spectator but, rather, the simple 
acknowledgement of the object’s self-a#rmation of its identity in a context of 
community. We would not be kind towards such an object if, to refrain from 
“objectifying” it, as it were, we simply refuse to call it by its name. "is would 
simply amount to a refusal to acknowledge the object as such. Rather, to make 
sure that, even in the spirit of so-called post-modernism, we do not overstep 
ourselves in this regard - namely, overestimating and overpowering our faculty 
of interpretation - we should embark on a new examination of the limits and 
the limitations of our powers of interpretation. To question, that is, how much 
what something is, is conditioned by our understanding relationship with it. In 
this regard, I believe that Duchamp’s readymades are a powerful post-modern 
attempt to regain a relationship with the object which is driven by and rooted 
in the everyday object’s naively candid yet authentic self-manifestation and self-
a#rmation. "e conviction of the importance of abiding by the “a-interesting 
attitude” on the part of the spectator and its enactment, enable the everyday 
object to manifest itself, corroborating to us that it also - happily, so to speak - 
sees itself as the object which we see it as. 
"is reading of the role of the readymades already indicates their importance 
and that of the “a-interesting attitude” for a renewed (aesthetic) awareness of the 
object as implied by the art of Duchamp. Yet, the importance of the readymades 
and the “a-interesting attitude” has to be further emphasized as I believe that to 
dwell in the “a-interesting attitude” is not a demand of just a select few of the 
works by Duchamp but is, rather, characteristic of the very essence of Duchamp’s 
contribution to western art and is, therefore, present in all his works. Not having 
the space to attempt a readying of each and every work of Duchamp, I choose to 
analyse, as a case in point of a work evidently di$erent from the readymades, !e 
Large Glass. 
!e Large Glass is a complex and huge undertaking. Indeed, “complex” is 
arguably the most pertinent and adequate description of this work. "e time-
contours of its creation are open-ended; it took years for Duchamp to complete 
it and he failed, making it an un!nished classic.25 Its complexity was fatefully 
further enhanced when cracks resulting from mishandling were approved by 
 25 See Marcel Duchamp, “Regions which are not Ruled by Time and Space,” in !e Writings of 
Marcel Duchamp, 127. 
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Duchamp as constitutive of its integral unity - he called them, in fact, “a ready-
made intention”26 - and thus to augment and complete, rather than diminish 
or ruin, its essence as a work. All this indicates that even physically, sheer open-
ended-complexity is the basic characteristic of this work. Also, e Large Glass 
gives the immediate impression of being the result of a very well thought out 
intellectual endeavour; of a laborious undertaking heavily endowed with 
re!ections, philosophical and artistic considerations. 
Indeed, I must note, it tends too easily to shi# the attention of the spectator 
away from itself towards the complex thoughts and artistic processes allegedly 
leading to it. is is also very much attuned to Duchamp’s own views on art. 
He had declared that art should move away from being purely “retinal” - and 
“olfactory,” mainly making direct reference to sensory and sensuous appeals 
‒ towards being more directed to, and intended for, the mind; to be more 
intellectual. I believe that no other work of his embodies this synthetic statement 
on his art better and more fully than e Large Glass and precisely here starts my 
conviction that the reading of the readymades that I presented above applies to 
this work in an even more powerful manner. 
Evidently, however, this work outrightly rejects at least one fundamental 
characteristic of the readymades, namely “simplicity.” e readymades are - 
evidently more or less - simple everyday objects whilst e Large Glass is a laborious 
work, surely not a found object. Indeed, even its o%cial title - e Bride Stripped 
Bare by Her Bachelors, Even - is complex. e other, common, one “e Large 
Glass” seems to be more of a useful short cut making reference simply to the 
work’s physical constitution. In fact, these two titles should be heeded together 
as indicative of the aesthetic-dynamics of this work; their relation unfolds the 
relationship between “complexity” and “simplicity” and their role in the work-
spectator creative act. 
On the one hand, there is a simple title that describes the work simply as what 
it factually is, namely a large glass or amalgam of two large glass planes with other 
materials in the middle; on the other hand, the complex - “artistic” - title which 
describes the work in such a way so as to initiate (interested and interesting) 
interpretative stories surrounding the factuality of the work, stories, as it were, 
with a life of their own. e complex title is not directly corroborated by the 
work. Necessarily, therefore, abiding by the title as descriptive or at least somehow 
indicative of the real subject-matter of the work - which its, albeit syncopated, 
narrative form itself teases the spectator to expect and to demand - anyone trying 
to make sense out of it in this way is immediately invited to start !oating freely 
 26 Ibid.; see also Paz, “#e Castle of Purity,” 28.
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and roaming into artistic, philosophical and traditional speculations on art. !e 
spectator is immediately teased and invited to simply forget the work, the object 
itself. 
But, how does e Large Glass present the same challenge set by the 
readymades? e Large Glass is simply a far more di%cult challenge to the 
spectator’s ability to endure and inhabit the work-spectator relationship honestly 
and truthfully; a challenge, that is, to let the work be precisely what it is: in this 
case, a very confused set and agglomerate of things – basically, distractions. 
Altogether a di#erent scenario from that of the readymades, here we are not 
confronted by a vulgar and found-everyday object that demands attention and 
whose very everyday simplicity acts as the prime distraction for the spectator to 
lose and forget the object but, rather, “complexity” is the prime distraction, used 
as both bait to deceive and occasion to redeem. e Large Glass stands on the 
other, far, side of the challenge-spectrum opened up by the readymades; it brings 
the challenge to the spectator to abide in the “a-interesting attitude” to new 
heights. !e evident and, at the same time vacuous and unclear “complexity” 
of e Large Glass - especially if read through Duchamp’s own writings in e 
Green Box27 - threatens to push even the most sensitive and honest spectator 
back into common-trodden clichés on art through which the work is rendered 
interesting, even revolutionary. In these ways, the work is always eased back into 
the traditional artworld scenario. According to my reading, therefore, e Large 
Glass is an ampli%ed challenge to the spectator posed by the readymades. e 
Large Glass is, ultimately, of the same species as the readymades. However, not 
only is its physical complexity more prone to numb the spectator’s sensibility 
and lead to indulgence in art speculations - as is also favoured by the complexity 
of the artistic title e Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even - but, also, 
as an utterly uncommon object with no place in a community of familiarity, it 
comes without the ability to help the sensitive spectator seeing it for what it 
is. e Large Glass, in this sense, is nothing at all. In e Large Glass, therefore, 
it is the “a-interesting attitude” itself that stands stark naked and, as soon as it 
manages to manifest itself, this object should disappear or rather dissolve into the 
nothingness which it is. 
!e embarrassment can be less powerful and less con&icting for the spectator 
in this extreme case than when confronted by the readymades because in this 
special case the spectator can, to all appearances, easily and safely reassure 
 27 Which Duchamp himself seems to encourage one to do. See his interview for the 
BBC’s e Late Show: Late Night Line-Up, June 15, 1968: “Marcel Duchamp, 1968 BBC 
Interview,” YouTube video, posted by Dennis Liu, April 1, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Bwk7wFdc76Y.
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himself of the adequacy of the attempt to “interpret” such an evidently complex 
and “interesting” work. e Large Glass’s vacuous complexity challenges the 
traditional work-spectator relationship simply by forcing a very complex, 
unknown and alien object, to present itself for what it is: nothing; surely nothing 
interesting. 
In e Large Glass therefore, the a-interesting attitude’s importance as the 
challenge for a renewed artistic expression and aesthetic understanding generally 
is completely distilled. I believe this work to be the ultimate indication that 
Duchamp’s work urges a recalibration of the work-spectator relationship through 
which Art properly claims itself anew as the space for the emergence of the object 
itself. !rough Duchamp, Art %ghts the prejudice that the interesting is the 
proper object of artistic expression, aesthetic understanding and appreciation 
and, also, of human attention generally.
Against the Interesting Prejudice
Prejudice is natural, not only in the artworld. In every context and every 
circumstance we tend to view whatever we encounter as con%rming our notions 
of ourselves, of our environment, our opinions, our culture and our values. To be 
sure, life would be rather di#cult if we were to discard all that constitutes our 
basic notions of ourselves and of our surroundings and, as it were, continuously 
start anew. Di#cult and, to a large extent, logically impossible. Yet, it is possibly 
when prejudice starts replacing thinking altogether and, consequently, when 
it starts to corrode our ability to be open and understanding towards what we 
encounter, that this word starts to corroborate the negative resonance with 
which it is now most commonly associated. According to the reading o$ered 
above, what art has been asking of us at least since Duchamp’s readymades is 
the bracketing of this negative prejudice. First and foremost, however, it has 
been urging us to remember and recollect our most basic healthy prejudices 
and to di$erentiate these from those other prejudices which are exposed when 
we utter, or act according to, the most common and widespread saids and not 
saids, and dos and don’ts, participating in the widespread “bullshit,” to say it with 
Frankfurt.28 
Basically, art is challenging us as to our capacity to be genuine spectators 
and listeners. As I have said above, “a-interesting” is not a value-judgement; 
the “a-interesting” does describe an object of no real intrinsic interest but the 
exact opposite: it challenges the spectator’s attentive sensibility to notice the 
 28 Harry Frankfurt de%ned the term “bullshit” precisely in terms of the common and the 
widespread. See his essay On Bullshit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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self-a rmation and self-acclamation of the object itself, thus to refrain from 
relating to whatever we encounter in terms of its “interest for us.” To dismiss and 
to quickly step into the making-interesting attitude are exactly the reactions to 
be avoided because they are essentially equally violent towards the object. And, if 
your reaction to, or your thoughts on, what is being said here is of the sort: “well, 
yes… whatever,” you are evidently still not touched by the ethical signi"cance 
of the readymades’ challenge to you. #e indi$erent object cannot shout at the 
spectator, but it urges us all as spectators to be "rst and foremost equally silent 
and to start listening. Only by listening can we become open to what challenges 
us responsibly into an alien encounter with a common object or phenomenon. 
It is true that to listen is far from understanding. Yet, listening is an essential 
prerequisite to understanding. We can say that listening helps us to see what 
challenges us all the time and deserves a genuinely respectful response. To listen 
and to see require that we slow down; it takes time and - which is the same 
for most of us today - it costs money. Money, in itself always an extrinsic and 
parasitic mode of evaluation, takes one’s look away from every object towards 
itself as the criterion of what is and what is not possible, doable, desirable, 
likeable, loveable, justi"able and permissible. O%en, in the everyday context 
it is very hard to even note challenging moments of this sort. O%en, too easily 
and hastily, too comfortably, we do not see a person, but an employee; not 
a man, but an amputee; not a woman, but a refugee. We see facets of faces, 
dismembered images, indeed snapshots. Snapshots and, more generally, the 
snapshot mentality - fostered also by the easily accessible, fast and concise29 
interactive news through the social and other media - helps us to quickly make 
up our minds and decide as to the “relationship” that we are to have with “the 
challenge,” whatever it may be. 
Confronted by a refugee, say, one can easily produce readymade saids and 
not-saids, both pro- and con- the presence of such people in our midst; both 
sides (pro- and con-) can indeed feel that they may be more or less original 
and bold in their beliefs and in their speaking and acting them out. O%en, for 
both pro- and con-, such immediate and generally loud manifestations serve 
as occasions to look interesting, interested and opinionated; an occasion to 
somehow look the part. At one and the same time, these are all occasions to 
not look “the refugee” in the face; easy way out manoeuvres to escape even 
the possibility of being engaged spectators and listeners of a real challenge. 
A real challenge is always complex, thus understanding it involves a laborious 
involvement. #e shocking and almost unbearable demands that I believe 
 29 Using the term in the manner of Noam Chomsky in “Concision in US Media.”
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Duchamp’s readymades and, even more strongly, e Large Glass make on the 
spectator, in the form of questions would look like these: Do you (still?) have 
the properly human strength to be a meaningful spectator and to listen? Can 
you manage to not foster whatever faces you with readymade images of your 
own spiritual and intellectual ego-centrality? Can you see beyond the bounds 
of your intelligence, of your culture, of your opinion and knowledge, of your 
own limited situatedness? Can you really see anything but yourself ? Can 
you spare a blank moment, surrendering the ammunition of bullshit which, 
normally, enables your busy tra!cking with and consumption of things and 
people, and look at me? Look at me!
I am afraid that the Duchamp-challenge - to heed the “indi#erence challenge” 
so as to access the “a-interesting attitude” - has been seldom appropriated in art 
and, consequently, it has as yet always been far from in$ltrating and in%uencing 
wider common everyday life situations. For instance, in the contemporary Euro-
African-Mediterranean region especially since the increase of the number of 
irregular migrants crossing the seas towards Europe and, speci$cally in Malta, 
where on the negative side extremist attitudes are %ourishing all around us 
vis-à-vis all those whose very presence threatens to slow down the pace of the 
comfortable busyness of our preciously noisy sheltered lives, on the positive 
side one would expect signi$cant public occasions where the other (the 
migrant or the refugee, that is) is evidently respected for being another - with 
his or her very own history, customs, opinions, religion, language, expectations 
and delusions - and not merely empathized with as one of a bunch (“migrants”) 
of unaccomplished (potentially) us. 
&us, the “a-interesting attitude” is, yes a phenomenon of aesthetic 
importance but, immediately and maybe more importantly, it is also a 
phenomenon of great ontological and ethical signi$cance. It urges us to clear 
ourselves of our own interests and to be honestly captivated by the object itself; 
to be captivated not merely by what, in the object, is obviously advantageous 
to and interesting for us but, rather, to stop, reckon with and listen to “the 
challenge,” the object itself. Only then may we start a new relationship with 
the object which, in turn, would probably enable us to start getting glimpses of 
genuinely new interests and genuinely new engagements of ours. Only in this 
way could we start reassuring ourselves that if and when something or someone 
waves at us from afar, calling at us and attempting to attract our attention, we 
can candidly and genuinely wave back to indicate that, at least, we see and 
truly acknowledge their presence. Genuine recognition and acknowledgment 
are the basis for an ethical relationship with the other.
